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ABSTRACT 
Wenzhou used to be one of the poorest regions in eastern China. With limited arable land, poor 
road access to major cities, and little support from the upper level governments, this region seemed to 
lack all the conditions necessary for economic growth. However, over the past several decades Wenzhou 
has developed the most dynamic private sector in China, and has accordingly achieved one of the fastest 
growth rates. In particular, the footwear industry in Wenzhou has grown from a negligible market share to 
the largest in China. Here, we report a survey of 140 Wenzhou-based footwear enterprises of various 
scales, and use this information to examine the driving forces behind the dramatic rural industrial growth 
seen in this region. Our results show that clustering deepens the division of labor in the production 
process and makes it possible for small entrepreneurial firms to enter the industry by focusing on a 
narrowly defined stage of production. Therefore, Wenzhou represents an example of how clustering plays 
a significant role in helping fledgling rural industries overcome the growth constraints of capital and 
technology in the incipient stage of industrialization. 
 
Keywords:   cluster; industrialization; finance; economic development; nonfarm 
economy.    1
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Located in the mountainous south-eastern part of Zhejiang Province, Wenzhou prefecture has a 
very limited amount of arable land at 0.52 mu (15 mu=one hectare) per capita, about one-third of the 
national average (Zhang and Li, 1990). Wenzhou’s proximity to Taiwan made it a likely war frontline in 
the planned economy era from 1949 to the late 1970s, meaning that neither the central or provincial 
(Zhejiang) governments were inclined to spare their limited resources for Wenzhou’s infrastructural and 
industrial development (Tsai, 2002). From 1949 to 1981, only 655 million yuan of public funds were 
invested in Wenzhou Prefecture (Zhang and Li, 1990), compared to an investment of 2.8 billion yuan in 
the neighboring Ningbo prefecture. Wenzhou also suffered from poor transportation, relying upon a 
single narrow mountain road for transportation of people and goods.
1 As a result, prior to reform in the 
late 1970s, the per capita income in Wenzhou was only 55 yuan, about one third of the provincial average 
(Zhang and Li, 1990). Wenzhou seemed to lack all the necessary conditions for textbook economic 
growth. Despite such unfavorable initial conditions, however, Wenzhou has developed the most dynamic 
private sector in China over the past several decades, with the result that it has shown one of the fastest 
growth rates in the country.
2 The footwear industry in particular has grown from a negligible input to the 
largest market share in China, and today forms one of the largest industrial clusters in the country.  
How did Wenzhou succeed in overcoming the capital and technical constraints of the 
industrialization process? What are the major factors that contributed to the formation of rural industrial 
clusters? Parris (1993) argued that local state corporatism was a major reason for growth in Wenzhou. 
Whereas Tsai (2002) stressed the importance of informal finance and other institutional innovations, and 
Zhang and Li (1990) identified a long list of factors contributing to the success of the “Wenzhou Model”. 
However, it is not possible to single out specific factors as being more important than others. This paper 
contributes to the literature from a different perspective by arguing that clustering has helped overcome 
the technical and capital barriers to entry for a large number of entrepreneurs.  
Here, we surveyed 140 Wenzhou-based footwear enterprises of various scales, and use the 
accumulated data to examine the driving forces behind the dramatic rural industrial growth seen in this 
region over the past few decades. Given that many developing countries and regions face similar 
pressures of land scarcity and poor infrastructure, the lessons and experiences drawn from the in-depth 
                                                      
1 Wenzhou Airport and Jin-Wen Railway were not completed until 1990 and 1998, respectively.  
2 Although GDP per capita in Wenzhou was 63 percent of the Chinese average in 1978, these values equalized in the 
early 1990s and the GDP per capita in Wenzhou was 78% higher than the national average in 2004 (Wenzhou 
Statistical Yearbook 2005, and China Statistical Yearbook 2005).    2
case study in Wenzhou may contribute to the literature on rural industrialization in other developing 
countries or regions. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the history of the Wenzhou footwear industrial cluster and describes our 
survey design. Sections 3 to 5 demonstrate how clustering helps overcome the technological, capital and 
institutional constraints in the process of industrialization. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the major 
findings and draws some lessons from this case study. 
   3
2.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE WENZHOU FOOTWEAR CLUSTER AND SURVEY 
DESIGN 
The traditional footwear industry has a history of over 500 years in Wenzhou. During the Ming 
Dynasty (1368-1644), Wenzhou footwear was renowned for its exquisite quality and was produced 
explicitly for the royal family. At the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China 
(1911), the Wenzhou footwear industry began to flourish. Fuqian Street, located in the heart of the city, 
was lined with dozens of footwear stores. 
In the 1920s, Shanghai, Xiamen and other cities employed workers from Wenzhou to make 
shoes. These shoemakers mastered advanced shoemaking processes, which they then brought back to 
Wenzhou. They became key technicians in the local footwear industry, and exerted a far-reaching 
influence on the development of the contemporary shoemaking industry in Wenzhou. In 1950, there were 
43 family footwear workshops and 103 employees in urban Wenzhou with annual output of 4,000 pairs of 
shoes (Yu and Yu, 1995).
3 Soon after, however, many of the private workshops and factories were 
nationalized or closed. The private shoemaking was largely depressed in the following three decades. By 
1978, there were only 19 footwear factories left, including two state-owned, eight collectively owned and 
nine privately owned shops, with a combined output of 496,800 pairs of shoes per year.
4  These “seed 
factories” trained a large number of technical workers, marketing specialists, and management talents, 
laying the groundwork for the emergence of the Wenzhou shoemaking industry in the subsequent reform 
era.  
After 1978, the Wenzhou private shoemaking business recovered rapidly. As state- and 
collectively-owned businesses gradually went under, more and more ex-employees set up their own 
workshops and the local shoemaking business boomed. By the end of 1981, there were 99 shoemaking 
factories in the Lucheng district of Wenzhou alone (Wenzhou City Annals, 1998). As of 2006, Wenzhou 
had become the most important footwear production base in China and was nicknamed the “Footwear 
Capital of China.” As shown in Figure 1, since the reform in the late 1970s, Wenzhou gradually formed a 
highly specialized and coordinated industrial cluster consisting of over 4,000 shoemaking factories (over 
30 leading companies with a yearly output value of more than 100 million yuan), 200 leather enterprises, 
380 footwear sole enterprises, 200 footwear machine manufacturers, 168 footwear last factories, 100 
                                                      
3 Wenzhou City Annals, Zhang Zhicheng, Wenzhou City Annals Compilation Committee, Beijing, Chunghua 
Bookstore, 1998. 
4 Wenzhou City Annals, Zhang Zhicheng, Wenzhou City Annals Compilation Committee, Beijing, Chunghua 
Bookstore, 1998.    4
footwear accessories and ornamental materials enterprises, 50 footwear design studios, and numerous 
specialized footwear-related information service agents, training schools, research institutes, and family 
workshops. These enterprises, institutions, and household workshops were linked together via numerous 
specialized markets, such as the Wenzhou “Footwear Capital” Market, the Hetongqiao Footwear 
Accessories and Ornamental Materials Market, the South Zhejiang Footwear Accessories and Ornamental 
Materials Market, the Original Leather Market, the Leather and Footwear Machine Market, and the 
Leather Chemical Market. In 2004, the total output of the Wenzhou footwear cluster amounted to 835 
million pairs (including 452,980,000 leather shoes, 3,440,000 cloth shoes, and 378,630,000 rubber 
shoes),
5 and the cluster employed over 400,000 people.
6 As shown in Figure 2, total shoe production in 
this region increased from 500 thousand pairs in 1978 to 835 million pairs in 2004, with an annual growth 
rate of 33%.  
For the present study, we first interviewed numerous individuals from government agencies, 
industrial associations, and enterprises in order to design and pretest our questionnaire.
7 From July to 
October 2005, we conducted a formal field survey in the key footwear production bases, including the 
Footwear Capital of China Industrial Park in the Lucheng District of Wenzhou City, the Shuangyu 
Industrial Park of Lucheng District, Oubei Township of Yongjia County, and Xincheng Township of 
Ruian City. We randomly selected our samples from firm lists provided by local governments or the 
industrial park administrative departments, interviewed the key managers or owners, and filled in the 
questionnaire. In total, we surveyed 140 footwear-related enterprises, which account for 2.77% of the 
total number of enterprises in the Wenzhou footwear cluster. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the 
survey. 
                                                      
5 Wenzhou Statistical Yearbook (2005). 
6 Wenzhou Footwear and Leather Industry Association.  
7 The questionnaire is available from authors upon request.   5
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Source: The data for 1995-2004 are from the Wenzhou Statistical Yearbooks of the corresponding years  
(1996-2005), whereas the data for 1978, 1985 and 1990 are from the Wenzhou City Annals (1998). 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics of the Survey 





















121 4,000  3.03%  3  3,500 459 547 
Footwear 
sole 
4 380 1.05%  30 1,100  570  612 
Footwear 
last 
2 168 1.19%  10  80 45  49 





7 100 7.00%  30  200 75  66 
Footwear 
machinery 
2 200 1.00%  90  500  295  290 
Total 140  5,048  2.77%  3  3,500  427  531 
Note: The final footwear products include leather shoes, leisure shoes, safety footwear, children's shoes, etc. 
The number of enterprises reflects the situation at the end of 2004. 
Source: Authors’ field survey.    7
3.  OVERCOMING TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS 
One of the major obstacles facing the small and medium rural enterprises in developing countries 
is that they often have difficulties in obtaining appropriate technologies. Caniëls and Romijn (2003) 
suggested that clustering helps existing firms to accumulate technological capabilities. The results of our 
present survey indicate that clustering may also help lower the technical barriers for the entry of 
newcomers. In the late 1970s when China started its reform, the average education level in Wenzhou was 
very low, and many entrepreneurs lacked sophisticated shoemaking knowledge. When clustering allowed 
the integral production process to be divided into small steps, however, the barriers for entry were 
lowered enough for many people to enter the production process. 
3.1 Features of the Entrepreneurs  
Table 2 displays the number of sample enterprises, the average years of schooling and 
Chuangdang of the founders, and their previous occupational backgrounds prior to entry into the footwear 
industry, divided by the year in which each business was started.
 This Chinese term “chuangdang” refers 
to the experience of working away from home, such as joining armies and doing a trade elsewhere. After 
leaving school, Wenzhou people tended to work or learn trades all across the country. These experiences 
became an asset, as they learned to obtain and use precious market information.  
Several interesting facts emerge from Table 2. Most of the entrepreneurs started their business 
after 1980; since then, the number of newcomers in the Wenzhou shoemaking industry has remained 
fairly stable. The average years of schooling received by business founders increased steadily over time, 
similar to the findings by Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka (2004) on Wenzhou’s low-voltage electric appliance 
cluster. However, at the early stage of the cluster, outside work experience is even more important than a 
formal education. Before setting up their own footwear enterprises, most of the entrepreneurs had worked 
elsewhere for many years and accumulated valuable experience. Through working elsewhere or in other 
trades, the founders accumulated the human and social capital required for setting up their own 
businesses. More importantly, they were exposed to market information, and thus tended to grasp 
emerging market opportunities more quickly. 
Although Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka (2002) found that most founders in the garment cluster of 
Zhejiang Province were former farmers, farming was the least prevalent profession among all the founder 
backgrounds identified in our survey. This may be due to the technological differences in the garment and 
footwear industries. In the early development period, the footwear industry lacked a specialized division 
of labor and coordination. Most family workshops produced whole shoes, requiring a high command of 
various techniques. As seen from Table 2, the proportion of newcomers with shoemaking experience has   8
remained relatively high, indicating the existence of technical barriers for newcomers. The participants 
were often ex-employees of state- or collectively-owned shoemaking enterprises in which shoes were 
manually produced using small machines. Thus, shoemaking “know-how” was critical for entrepreneurs 
to enter the business and the industry was dominated by skilled workers because technology barriers 
prohibited unskilled individuals (such as farmers) from entry. This point is supported by the high ratio of 
founders who reported having worked in shoemaking factories in the early 1980s.  
Table 2:  Characteristics of Entrepreneurs at the Time of Starting Their Firms 








No. of enterprises  4 18  27  31  38  22 
Years of schooling  6.25 7.97  8.02  9.03  9.70  9.18 
Years of 
Chuangdang 
5.00 7.38  8.50  9.68  11.16  14.53 
Occupation %            
 Farmers  0.00  11.11  18.52  16.13  13.16  13.64 
 Factory workers  50.00  27.78  37.04  29.03  13.16  9.09 
 Marketing 
specialists  




25.00 27.78  18.52  19.36  23.68  22.73 
Proportion of entrepreneurs with experience in the footwear 
industry % 
    
 Related to footwear  
 Industry 
75.00 77.78  22.22  48.39  42.11  59.09 
Note: The top row indicates the year of firm establishment. Years of schooling and years of Chuangdang are the 
averages of each respective group. 
Source: Based upon the data from authors’ field survey in Wenzhou. 
Notably, however, the ratio of founders having prior shoemaking experience has declined over 
time, while the proportion of marketing specialists has risen steadily from an initially low proportion. 
These findings are similar to those of Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka (2004) in the low-voltage electric appliance 
industry. With the formation of clusters, the shoemaking industry has become increasingly specialized 
and the technology barrier has gradually weakened. With the rapid increase in supply in the 1980s, the 
market underwent a fundamental change from the demand to supply side. As the market matured, 
marketing skills become more crucial, and individuals with marketing skills began to enjoy a comparative 
advantage in the emerging competitive environment. This may explain the increasing proportion of 
salespeople who joined the industry in the later period.   9
3.2 The Diffusion of Footwear Technology  
At the turn of the 1980s, when China started its transition from a command economy to a market 
economy, footwear products were in seriously short supply. This strong market demand prompted many 
employees of state or collectively-owned footwear factories, especially technicians, to set up their own 
footwear stalls or family workshops and produce whole shoes by themselves. Due to the highly 
technological requirements for whole-shoe production, most of the early newcomers to the industry were 
former technicians from the state or collective firms. 
Figure 3 graphs the diffusion process of production technology since the late 1970s. A good 
example of technical diffusion may be seen in the state-owned Dongfanghong Leather Footwear Factory, 
which gave rise to three major enterprises, namely Jierda Footwear Co., LTD., China Aolun Shoes Co., 
LTD., and Wenzhou Dashun Footwear Machinery Manufacture Co., LTD., as well as many smaller 
enterprises, such as the Tailong Footwear Last Factory. Table 3 displays the backgrounds of the founders 
of these four enterprises, who were all associated with the state-owned Dongfanghong Leather Footwear 
Factory.  
Having the experience of apprenticeship was found to be a major asset in setting up shoemaking 
businesses. The most prominent example of this is Mr. Yu Ashou, the founder of Jierda Footwear Co., 
LTD. As shown in Figure 3, he had 16 apprentices, 15 of whom set up their own companies, while the 
last one became his son-in-law and worked in Jierda Footwear Co., LTD. (Yuan, 2003). 
Copying and spin-offs further increased footwear production and the rate of technological 
diffusion. Aokang and Hongqingting are two typical examples of spin-offs. Wang Zhentao and Qian 
Jinbo first worked as carpenters and later sold shoes together until 1988, when they co-founded a leather 
shoe factory. In 1995, the factory split into the Aokang Group and the Hongqingting Group, which still 
exist today. After the split, both groups grew into leading footwear companies. The formation of an 
industrial cluster is a process of production and technological diffusion through copying of others. 
Success of one enterprise often lures others to imitate, resulting in numerous enterprises being duplicated. 
As far as Wenzhou’s diffusion channels are concerned, this process was accomplished primarily through 
relatives and friends (Zhu, 2005).    10


















































Source: Authors’ field survey. 
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Factory Li  Deen
Jierda Footwear 
Factory Yu  Ashou
Aolun Footwear 
Factory Yao  Wanfu
Dashun Footwear making 
Machine Factory  Xia 
Zhengyi 
Tailong Footwear Last 
Huang Yongbin
Juyi Group  
Li Ailian
Dongyi Footwear 
Factory Chen Guorong 
Chali Footwear 
Factory Xie Aiguo
Mr. Yu Ashou taught 16 
students and 15 of them 
founded their own footwear 
factories   11
Table 3:  Backgrounds of the Founders of Four Enterprises Derived From the 
Dongfanghong Shoemaking Factory 
Name of Enterprise  Founders  Positions in Dongfanghong  
before setting up enterprises 
Jierda Footwear Co., LTD.  Yu Ashou  Head of workshop  
China Aolun shoes Co., LTD.  Yao Wanfu  In charge of production 
Wenzhou Dashun Footwear 
Machinery Manufacture Co., 
LTD. 
Xia Zhengyi  In charge of machine repair 
Tailong Footwear Last Factory  Huang Yongbin  Senior technician 
Source: Authors’ field survey. 
In summary, the shoemaking technologies were available in Wenzhou prior to reform, but were 
quickly disseminated after reform. This then leads to the next question: why has the footwear industry in 
Wenzhou grown much faster than in many other places where shoemaking technologies were equally 
available prior to reform?  
3.3 Division of Labor Lowers Technical Constraints 
Here, we argue that clustering deepens the division of labor in the production process and makes 
it possible for small entrepreneurial firms to enter the industry by focusing on a narrowly defined stage of 
production. In the clusters, the spin-offs of the old firms did not only duplicate the existing technologies, 
they engineered many innovations in the production process. While it is generally recognized that 
division of labor can improve production efficiency (Smith, 2003), its role in breaking the barriers to 
entry has largely been neglected. Our study shows that clustering has simplified complex production 
processes into small steps which not only lowered technical and capital barriers to entry but also took full 
advantage of a wide range of entrepreneurial talents scattered in rural areas.  
First, the division of labor initially decomposes complicated footwear products into numerous 
intermediary products, thereby enabling many entrepreneurs without shoemaking backgrounds to 
participate. Table 4 lists seven categories and over 20 varieties of intermediary products in the footwear 
cluster. From the list, newcomers can choose appropriate products according to their technological 
capacity.    12
Table 4:  Intermediary Products of Shoes 
Assortments Intermediary  products 
Upper of footwear  Leather, PV leather, PVC leather, etc. 
Sole of footwear  Outsole, mid-sole, insole, heel, sock lining, heel pad, etc. 
Lining of footwear  Fore-lining, back-lining, sponge, cloth material, foam, etc. 
Materials of footwear  Filament, cement (rubber cement, neoprene), crepe, etc. 




Footwear buckle, slide fastener, lace, edging, elastic band, etc. 
Packing materials  Box/carton, brand, tag, label ticket, tissue paper, drying agent, etc. 
Source: Authors’ field survey. 
Second, for each of the above intermediary product, further divisions of labor were carried out to 
decompose the production process into smaller steps, remarkably reducing the technical difficulty. Some 
auxiliary steps in the production process can even accommodate the elderly and disabled. In the rural 
Yongjia County of Wenzhou, we found that some women used simple tools to assemble small metal 
components like shoe accessories and buckles during the slack farming season. Schmitz and Nadvi (p. 
1503, 1999) pointed out that “clustering is particularly relevant for the early stage by helping small 
enterprises to grow in riskable steps.” Our case study provides support for their argument.  
Finally, division of labor can also make better use of the talents of entrepreneurs. More competent 
entrepreneurs can accommodate more production steps into a firm or organize them within an effective 
vertical integration, whereas less competent entrepreneurs may only work on one or a few steps at the 
appropriate scale. Therefore, division of labor could adequately tap the potentials of a wide range of rural 
entrepreneurs that are abundant in villages and townships in Wenzhou. This point is in consistent with the 
observation by Hayami, Kikuchi and Marciano (1998) on metal craft industry in the Philippines.  
   13
4.  OVERCOMING CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
4.1 The Constraints of Start-up Capital Investments 
Lack of access to adequate start-up capital has been recognized as an important deterrent to the 
growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries (Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Pretes, 
2002; Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Hernández-Trillo, Pagán, and Paxton, 2005). This is because banks are 
generally cautious in providing SMEs with loans for start-up capital. Among the 140 enterprises we 
surveyed, only two had received bank loans in their incipient stage: one was founded in 1996 with an 
investment of 500,000 yuan, including a 40% bank loan; the other was founded in 2000 with an 
investment of 500,000 yuan, receiving a 20% bank loan. Table 5 details the sources of the start-up capital 
for all surveyed enterprises. Over two-thirds of the start-up capital came from individual investments, 
24.94% from relatives and friends of the founders, 8.35% from the public or other resources, and only a 
negligible 0.34% from banks. Among the 118 enterprises with complete answers, only six had raised 
funds from public sources, accounting for 20%-67% of their initial investments. In summary, Wenzhou 
shoemakers mainly relied on funds obtained from themselves, relatives and friends for start-up capital 
instead of formal financing.  
Table 5:  Sources of Start-up Funds  














1,307.48 287.00  204.40  6.79  43.58  120.86  1,970.11
Percentage 
(%) 
66.37 14.57  10.37  0.34 2.21  6.14  100.00 
Note: Each initial investment value is deflated by the price index of fixed capital investment of Zhejiang province, 
which was obtained from the Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook and China Statistics Yearbook. 
Source: Calculated from authors’ field survey data. 
With such limited access to formal financing, how did the SMEs in Wenzhou overcome capital 
constraints? One strand of the literature (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005) argues that informal financing 
matters more to industrial growth than formal financing. However, informal financing alone may not be 
sufficient to explain how the SMEs in Wenzhou overcame capital constraints, because informal financing 
was available at similar levels in other places that did not experience such active growth, such as Henan   14
and Fujian Provinces (Tsai, 2002). Thus, there must be other factors at work. In this paper, we stress the 
importance of clustering in lowering the capital barriers to entry.
8 
Clustering effectively decomposed the shoemaking process into many small steps, which required 
much lower levels of fixed investments. Under this model, different entrepreneurs could choose different 
production types based on their financial resources and risk tolerance. Table 6 lists the investments 
required to start footwear-related businesses during different periods. The surveyed enterprises differed 
significantly in terms of start-up capital, ranging from 500 to 3,567,400 yuan, reflecting different 
production modes and investment timing.
9 The minimum, maximum and average amounts of start-up 
investment have increased over time. Although the threshold of start-up capital has risen on average, the 
minimum investment remains relatively low, indicating that many entrepreneurs should still be able to 
afford to enter the shoemaking business. 
Table 6:  The Amount of Start-up Funds during Different Periods （1000 yuan） 
Years Number  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Up to 1980  4  0.5  70.7  20.9  33.5 
1981-1985 14  0.9  225.3  35.0  61.1 
1986-1990 25  2.5  312.7  66.1  91.7 
1991-1995 27  0.5  272.1  64.9  72.2 
1996-2000 32  11.1  3,567.4  246.2  612.7 
2001-2005 16  8.9  3,095.7  490.3  914.5 
Note: Among the 140 enterprises we surveyed, 20 of the founders or managers failed to respond or give clear 
answers and 2 were new enterprises. If we deduct these 22 enterprises from the total, 118 enterprises remain. All 
initial investment values were revised based on the price index of fixed capital investment of Zhejiang province, which 
was obtained from the Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook and the China Statistics Yearbook (2006). Among the enterprises 
founded during 1996-2000, two had start-up funds of 3,567,400 and 3,095,700 yuan respectively. If these two 
enterprises are excluded from our calculation, then the average start-up funds of the two periods are only 139,000 
and 160,700 yuan respectively. 
Source: Calculated from data collected by authors. 
Having looked at the start-up capital, we next analyze how these enterprises have overcome the 
constraints of working capital. Table 7 provides the prevalence of different channels adopted by the 
enterprises when in need of working capital. Our survey found that 44% of the enterprises preferred to 
borrow from indirect relatives and friends, followed by banks (20%), then from direct relatives (11%). 
Very few chose to raise funds publicly. This led us to question why firms depended less on direct 
                                                      
8 Ruan, Wei, and Zhang (2006) discuss in detail how clustering helps lower the barriers to entry based on a case study on the 
Puyan cashmere sweater industrial cluster in Zhejiang Province. 
9 The Kangnai Group had an initial investment capital of only 500 yuan when it was founded in 1980, and went on 
to become one of the biggest shoemakers in China. This group owns 14 advanced automatic production lines, and its 
output reached 1.2 billion yuan in 2004.   15
relatives when raising funds for working capital versus start-up capital. Further analysis showed that 
funds raised from direct relatives tended not to bear interest or have definite payment deadlines. Since the 
borrowers could use these funds for relatively long periods without penalty, they most often spent the 
monies for start-up capital. 















15 62 28 4 16  15  140 
Percentage￿%￿  10.71 44.29 20.00 2.86 11.43  10.71  100.00 
Source: Based upon authors’ field survey. 
Another common practice is the use of trade credits from upstream enterprises to ease working 
capital constraints. Members of the footwear clusters are located in close proximity to one another, 
leading to repeated business transactions and the formation of a certain level of trust among the upstream 
and downstream firms in the production chain. These entities, which are engaged in the same chain of 
production and well aware of each other’s credit histories, form a multilateral default penalty mechanism. 
As shown in Table 8, we examined whether the surveyed enterprises purchased goods based on credits 
provided by upstream enterprises. Our results revealed that most of the investigated enterprises receive 
credits with a term of no longer than three months. Trade credits are an important channel by which 
Wenzhou shoemakers mitigate their working capital constraints. Usually, the upstream firms are big and 
can easily obtain loans from state banks. Meanwhile, banks are more willing to lend to established 
enterprises capable of mortgaging their fixed assets. Therefore, bank loans are often more readily 
available to firms for use as working capital versus start-up capital. 
Table 8:  The Patterns of Trade Credits from Upstream Suppliers 



























78 17  17  7  2  12 7  140 
Percentage￿%￿ 55.72  12.14  12.14  5.00  1.43  8.57  5.00  100.00
Source: Calculated from authors’ field survey.   16
5.  BREAKING INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS  
In addition to the technical and economic constraints, a series of institutional constraints have 
typically limited the formation of clusters. Thus, the formation of the Wenzhou footwear cluster was also 
a process of deepening reform. At the beginning, the founders of the Wenzhou shoemaking enterprises 
faced two institutional constraints: ownership risk and contract risk.   
5.1 Avoiding ownership risk 
At the beginning of reform, China had no market economy system in place. As a result, private 
property rights were still constrained by ideology. Private economic activities in this period were often 
branded as “illegal market activities” and were suppressed by the government. This meant that 
entrepreneurs faced questions regarding how to circumvent ownership risk and obtain individual 
economic liberty. In order to avoid direct conflicts with the legal system and ideology, and to reduce the 
high transaction costs caused by branding, many private enterprises resorted to some makeshift practices 
such as attaching themselves to a legal enterprise or organization to avoid ownership risk.
10 Through these 
practices, they not only managed to legalize their private enterprises, but also gained access to formal 
financing. The role of local governments was not negligible in this process, as their acquiescence and 
even support for these private innovations enabled Wenzhou shoemakers to break through the 
institutional constraints and circumvent the crucial ownership risk (Zhang and Li, 1990). 
5.2 Reducing Contract Performance Risk 
A deepening division of labor creates a higher coordination cost among different parties involved 
in the transaction (Becker and Murphy, 1992). The efficient functioning of markets requires good contract 
enforcement. To be credible, the organization that enforces contracts must have the power to force people 
to adhere to its decisions (North, 1990). However, given that the Chinese legal system is incomplete and a 
credit system has not yet been established, the cost of enforcing contracts by legal means, such as through 
a court case, is very high. Since litigation costs often exceed the value of the transaction, it is often not 
economical to rely only on formal contracts. Thus, social trust is often used to help enforce contracts and 
reduce transaction costs. In our survey, we examined how enterprises in the Wenzhou footwear cluster 
generally resolved contract conflicts. Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. 
                                                      
10 Those that become affiliated with public enterprises were called “hang-on household enterprises” (or “guahu 
qiye”), since they attached themselves to state-owned enterprises by paying to use their name, stationery, receipts, 
and account numbers. Those that chose to register as collectives with neighborhood or village committees were 
said to “wear a red hat” (Tsai, 2002).   17
Table 9:  Conflict Resolution Modes between Enterprises 









4 9  94  7  26  140 
Percentage￿%￿  2.86 6.43  67.14  5.00  18.57  100.00 
Source: Calculated according to the data collected by authors’ field survey. 
Among the 140 enterprises in the sample, 94 explicitly expressed that they resolved contractual 
conflicts through out-of-court negotiation, whereas only four reported going to court. Due to the 
incomplete legal system, going to court costs both money and energy, and even if a party wins a lawsuit, 
the winner may not be able to receive the full compensation. Consequently, negotiation out-of-court has 
become a popular substitute for formal contracts.  
In addition to social trust, the cluster also relies on market forces to reduce the transaction cost. 
Wenzhou created various specialized markets, such as the Footwear Accessories and Ornamental 
Materials Market, the Original Leather Market, the Leather and Footwear Machine Market, and the 
Leather Chemical Market, to facilitate concentrated transactions. Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka (2002) argued 
that the local marketplace, where enterprises can easily purchase materials and sell products to local 
traders, plays a critical role in easing the entry of new enterprises. With the pressure of easy entry, 
specialized markets maintain disciplines on transaction partners and consequently reduce the risk of 
transaction failure. As more potential transaction partners enter a given market, each transaction becomes 
more replaceable, causing competitors to increase transaction efficiency.   
The presence of various specialized markets of intermediate goods also helps reduce the holdup 
problem often discussed in the firm literature. Hold-up problem describe a situation where one party (such 
as a manufacture) refrains from establishing an agreement with another party (such as a supplier) due to 
concerns that it may give the other party increased bargaining power, and thereby reduce their own 
profits. Modern transaction economics (Williamson, 1985) reckons that one key reason for the existence 
of a firm is to avoid the holdup problem among the chain of production in the presence of frequency, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity (forgone economic benefits of discontinuing a relationship). With 
specialized markets for major supplies of shoe production nearby, a firm can easily buy all the necessary 
materials from the market and does not need to worry about being held up by a big supplier. Likewise, 
clustering the production of both final and intermediary goods allows a firm to choose among multiple 
suppliers at any production stage, once again reducing the likelihood of holdup. This makes the traditional 
large firms with vertical integration less desirable in the Wenzhou footwear cluster, opening more 
opportunities for small and median enterprises.    18
6.  LESSONS FROM THIS CASE 
China’s rapid industrial growth has received wide attention in the literature (Allen, Qian, and 
Qian, 2005). As the most dynamic private economy in China, Wenzhou provides an opportunity for us to 
examine the driving forces behind China’s fast rural industrialization. Several lessons can be drawn from 
the results of our survey.  
First, the formation of the footwear cluster was, to a large extent, path-dependent. Because 
footwear production was a major industry in Wenzhou prior to reform, shoemaking technology was 
readily diffused when the market demand for shoes suddenly emerged after the success of rural reform. 
The existence of the state and collectively-owned footwear factories in the planned economy era made it 
possible for the footwear cluster to blossom in Wenzhou.   
Second, challenges beget opportunities. Facing adverse living and production conditions, many 
natives of Wenzhou fled. However, although the disadvantageous environment restricted economic 
development, it also created opportunities. After China’s opening and reform, Wenzhou’s entrepreneurs 
observed the dramatic rise in demand and effectively seized the opportunity to massively produce shoes. 
The adverse natural and infrastructure conditions also helped forge a unique regional social culture in 
Wenzhou, promoting entrepreneurship, risk-taking, hard working, and the value of friendships. These 
factors played a significant role in maintaining the functioning of clusters through contract enforcement 
and informal financing. The establishment of the “Wenzhou Model” is, in a sense, the result of 
individuals being cornered by disadvantageous factors and finding a way to turn them into advantages. 
Third, the capital and technical constraints for rural industrialization in developing countries may 
be less serious than that generally suggested in the literature (Ayyagari et. al., 2006). When facing the 
constraints of technology and credit, traditional thinking emphasizes the removal of these limiting factors. 
Along this line of thinking, for example, micro credits have been widely promoted in many developing 
countries. The experience from the footwear cluster in Wenzhou, however, illustrates that the credit 
constraints facing many SMEs may have induced the deepening division of labor and promoted rural 
industrialization. Clustering lowers both the technical and capital barriers to entry and enables a wide 
range of rural talents to become involved in the production process. The high coordination cost as a result 
of increasing division of labor in the cluster has been largely overcome by the strong social capital 
inherent in the rural community in Wenzhou. Thus, while functional financial systems are important to 
economic development, they may not constitute a necessary precondition for rural industrialization.  
To conclude, economic development itself is a process of continuously confronting limiting 
factors and identifying solutions. Innovations, both in terms of institutions and technology, are the driving   19
forces behind the phenomenon of the “Wenzhou Model.” Because the “Wenzhou Model” has been widely 
accepted and highly recognized in China, the formation and evolution of the Wenzhou shoemaker cluster 
is not only significant in itself, but also as a means to understand and interpret the development of China’s 
economy and institutional transformation.    20
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